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HIGHWAYS, ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:
THE CHANGING NOTION OF NECESSITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Highway construction has increased during the last two decades
in order to placate multicar Americans who, with their increasing
affluence, have demanded low density suburban living away from
their urban jobs1 and coast to coast travel during leisure periods.
Along with this rapid expansion, however, has come serious threats
to the environment in the form of air pollution and the destruction
of irreplaceable natural resources.2
Regrettably, highway planners have not been zealous in their
efforts to minimize these problems." To be sure, these planners
1. Aurbach, Environmental Policy and Urban Transportation (Urban Freeway Manifesto
Revisited 4 Usa. LAW 713, 733 (1972).
[Tlhe American way of life has assumed the multi-car family living on a large
lot, provided with the necessary highways and other public services, and man-
dated by zoning and subdivision controls.
Id.
As this note was being put into final form, the United States was experiencing an
acute fuel shortage. At this point it is premature to attempt to determine the precise
effect that this shortage will have on highway construction since the extent of the fuel
problem is not yet fully known. It seems likely, however, that highway construction will
not continue at a rapid pace as in the past.
But it is foreseeable that those highways which will be constructed will be built along
short, and direct routes in order to conserve fuel. Thus, those environmental amenities
which stand in the way could very well be sacrificed in the name of fuel conservation.
2. Note, Eminent Domain and the Environment, 56 CORN= L. REv. 651 n. 3 cittng
McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE 31 (1969).
In highway design, the problem Is reduced to the simplest and most common-
place terms: traffic, volume, design speed, capacity, pavements, structures,
horizontal and vertical alignment These considerations are married to a thor-
oughly spurious cost benefit formula and the consequence of this institutionalized
myopia are seen in the scars upon the land and In the cities.
Who are as arrogant as unmoved by public values and concerns as high-
way commissions and engineers? . . . Give us your beautiful rivers and valleys
and we will destroy them: Jones Falls in Baltimore, the Schuylkill River in
Philadelphia, Rock Creek in Washington, the best beauty of Staten Island, the
Stony Brook-Milestone Valley near Princeton.
Id.
S. Id.
If one seeks a single example of an assertion of simple-minded single purpose,
the analytical rather than the synthetic view and indifference to natural proc-
esses--Indeed an anti-ecological view-then the highway and its creators leap
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
must first ascertain whether the proposed highway is needed, and
whether the land in question is needed for the project before any
land can be condemned.4 However, this determination of the neces-
sity of the taking does not specifically include an assessment of
environmental consequences. Recently, in an attempt to curb en-
vironmental abuse, the federal government and a few states have
enacted statutes requiring that environmental effects be taken into
account in the planning and construction of highways and other
projects which are potentially harmful to the environment.5
These environmental statutes, as well as increased environmen-
tal concern on the part of the courts, have inserted a new element
into the necessity equation. Now the question of necessity must
also include a determination of whether the taking is environment-
ally sound. This note will trace the changes which these statutes
have made in the legislative determination of necessity, and will
describe the role of the courts in implementing this new standard.
II. BACKGROUND - THE COMMON LAW NECESSITY RULE
Eminent domain is defined "as the power of the sovereign
to take property for public use without the owner's consent upon
making just compensation."a This power flows from the state's
position as sovereign.7
Most courts have held that absent a specific statutory or con-
stitutional authorization, a determination concerning the necessity
of a particular exercise of eminent domain power is a matter
to be left to legislative discretion.8 The fair and just resolution
of this question could be facilitated by resort to judicial processes.
to mind. There are other aspirants who vie to deface shrines and desecrate
sacred cows, but surely it is the highway commissioner and engineer who most
passionately embrace Insensitivity and philistinism as a way of life and pro-
fession.
Id.
4. GUY, STATE HIGHWAY CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES 47 (1971).
5. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970) provides
that a "detailed statement" shall be included "in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. ... Provisions similar to this also appear in many state statutes,
see e.g., CAL. PUE. REs. CODE § 21102 (West Supp. 1973).
6. 1 NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 1-9 (3rd ed. 1973).
7. Id. § 1.13[4], at 1-19.
8. Id. § 4.11. at 4-138. Specifically the proscribed questions are as follows:
(1) Whether there Is necessity for the taking,
(2) Whether there is any need for resorting to eminent domain In effecting such
acquisition,
(3) Whether the time is a fitting one,
(4) Whether' there is a need for the property to the extent sought to be acquired,
(5) Whether there is a need for the particular tract sought to be acquired (and,
correlatively, whether another tract would not betteV serve the purposes
of the condemnor),
(6) Whether there is any need for the particular estate sought to be condemned,
(7) Whether the mode of acquisition with respect to the instrumentalities em-
ployed, such as a state officer, an individual, or a corporation, is proper
insofar as the exercise of the legislative discretion is concerned.
Id. } 4.11, at 4-147-4-142 (footnotes omitted),
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Nevertheless, once the legislature has made its decision, the land-
owner has no constitutional right to question the necessity of this
determination before a judicial body.9 The reason is that the
court is powerless to challenge a legislative enactment unless it
violates a constitutional provision. 10 Nearly all those constitutions
that do refer to the state's eminent domain power provide only
that the state must make just compensation when it takes land
for public use without the owner's consent.11 No state has a con-
stitutional provision requiring that land be taken only for neces-
sary projects1 2 Though the court may consider the project unwise,
or the site ill chosen, it may not substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature.""
The court, however, is not totally precluded from intervening.
Where the legislature has abused its discretion by taking land
without considering whether the land is needed, the court may
hold the taking to be unlawful.14  The court may also act if it
finds that the legislature has acted in bad faith. 5 Thus, the question
of whether a public necessity exists at all is ultimately a judicial
one. 6 But even though the courts have this power, they have
rarely exercised it."7 Furthermore, the party alleging arbitrariness
on the part of the state has a heavy burden of proof.18
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL EXERCISE OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN POWER
When the federal government builds a highway, vast amounts
of land must be condemned." To ensure that federal agencies
take environmental factors into account when assessing the need
9. Id. § 4.11[1], at 4-155. "It does not . . . follow merely because such questions are often
open to a doubt, and because evidence and argument might be of assistance in coming to
a decision, that they are necessarily judicial and should be passed upon by the courts. Id.
10. Id. § 4.1111]. at 4-156. In a few states, constitutional provisions have been enacted to
provide for Judicial determination of the questions of necessity. Id. § 4.11[41, at 4-201.
Many states have statutes which vest the courts with such power. Id. § 4.11[4], at 4-202.
The judicial test for necessity is a liberal one. The state need not show that the
project cannot be constructed at all If the land In question is not taken; the state must
prove only that the land is reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement. Id. §
4.11[4], at 4-203. In applying this test, however, the courts have not been eager to place
restrictive limits on the power of the condemnor. Id. § 4.11[4], at 4-203 n. 22 quoting
Latchis v. State Highway Board, 120 Vt. 120, 134 A.2d 191, 194 (1957).
11. Id. § 1.3, at 1-78-1-79.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 4.11[l], at 4-156.
14. Id. § 4.11[2], at 4-157.
15. Id.
16. Id. "In every case, therefore, It Is a judicial question whether the taking is of such
a nature that it is or may be founded on a public necessity." Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Id. § 4.11[2], at 4-163.
18. Id. § 4.11[2], at 4-165.
19. Pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 108 (1970), the states may condemn land for the interstate
highway system, even though the federal government pays most of the costs. It has been
posited that juries will award smaller verdicts to landowner's when the state is the taker.
Vogel, Observations on the Trial of Eminent Domain Cases, 16 PRAC. LAw., 40, 47 (Oct.
1970).
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for these projects, Congress has enacted the National Environmental
Policy Act 20 and has added specific provisions to the Federal Aid
Highway Act2 1 and Department of Transportation Act.2 2 But in
mandating that these agencies make decisions apprised of all en.-
vironmental consequences, Congress left unclear the role of the
courts.2 3 Are the courts simply to determine whether all procedural
requirements have been met, or can they look closer at the basis
for the agency's decision? Also, what is the ultimate standard
of review that courts may use?
A. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196924 (NEPA) is
divided into two major chapters. The first subchapter sets out
national environmental goals and policies and includes directives
with which federal agencies must comply in their decisionmaking
process.25 The second subchapter creates the Council on Environ-
mental Quality.
Unfortunately, the language of the statute concerning agency
responsibilities is less than precise. For example section 4332 (2) (B)
of the Act directs federal agencies to:
identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental ameni-
ties and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical consider-
ations.
2 1
In applying these imperspicuous provisions, courts have struggled
with the question of how far they may go in reviewing agency
action under NEPA's requirements. This question can be divided
into two parts: first, is the court to be concerned only with pro-
cedural compliance or may it also determine whether the agency
has complied with the substantive policy elements of the act?;
and second, once the kind of review has been determined, what
is the ultimate standard of review that a court must use?
A dispute concerning the power of courts to review substantive
agency decisions on the merits has developed among the circuits.28
The Tenth Circuit has ruled that no substantive review of agency
20. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
21. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
22. Department of Transportation Act of 1969, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
23. Judicial review is not specifically mentioned in any of the above acts.
24. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
25. Id. §§ 4331-4335.
26. Id. §§ 4341-4347.
27. Id. § 4332(2) (B).
28. The illustrative cases in this section do not deal specifically with highway con-
struction. However, it is apparent that building a highway is a "major federal action sig-
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decisions is possible under NEPA;2 9 the Second, Eighth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits, on the other hand, have sanctioned
such review.80 In National Helium Corporation v. Morton,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the Secretary of the Interior must comply with NEPA in cancelling
a helium conservation contract because that action has environ-
mental consequences. 2 In assessing the requirements of NEPA,
the court observed that they are procedural only and do not control
agency decisionmaking. 8 Furthermore, the court felt that NEPA's
purpose, which is to make the agency aware of environmental
consequences, would be carried out through strict adherence to
the prescribed statutory procedures .
4
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 5 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
adopted a similar position concerning judicial inquiry. In granting
a temporary injunction to prohibit further construction on the Cos-
satot River Dam until the Corps had compiled an adequate impact
statement, the court was careful to point out that NEPA does
not create substantive rights in addition to its procedural require-
ments.3 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that NEPA created
a substantive right to a "safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings. '2 T However, the court made
it clear that a mere mechanical compliance was not enough and
did not hesitate to undertake a searching inquiry into the facts
to determine whether NEPA's procedural requirements had been
met. For example, the court found the agency's environmental
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment" under § 432(2) (C) of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Indeed, one commentator has stated that "highway
cases predominate amongst the reported Judicial decisions construing NEPA". Note, Litiga-
tion, the Freeway Revolt: Keith v. V7oZpe, 2 EcoLoGy L. Q. 761 (1972). Thus, the principles
set out would clearly apply to highway cases.
29. National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971).
30. Environmental Defense Fund. Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs., U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972) ; Scenic Hudson Preserve Conf. v. Fed-
eral Power Com'n., 453 F.2d 463, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) ;
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
32. Id. at 656.
The Secretary in the instant case proposes to take an action which has environ-
mental consequences, namely rapid depletion of the helium resources of the coun-
try. Whether the Secretary's proposed action has significant long range conse-
quences, or whether the environmental effects are insignificant in relationship
to the countervailing government interests, are decisions which are left to the
Secretary. The important thing is that he must consider the problem.
Id.
32. Id. at 656. "The decisions are . . . clear that the mandates of the NEPA pertain to
procedures and do not undertake to control decision making within the departments."
Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Id.
35. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of United States Army, 825
F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
36. Id. at 755.
37. Id.
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impact statement to be inadequate, essentially because it did not
contain all known possible environmental consequences of the pro-
posed agency action. 38 The court was adamant about ensuring
that the record be complete. "Then, if the decision makers choose
to ignore such factors, they will be doing so with their eyes wide
open.
' 39
On rehearing, the district court vacated the injunction and dis-
missed the action because it found that the Corps' new environ-
mental impact statement met the disclosure requirements of
NEPA. 40 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the environ-
mental impact statement was sufficient. 41 However, the court of
appeals disagreed with the district court's assessment that the
defendant's need only comply with the procedural requirements
of NEPA. 42 After surveying the legislative history of NEPA, the
court asserted that the purpose of the procedural requirements
is to guarantee that its policies will be implemented by the agency.48
Recognizing the agency responsibility to put into effect the substan-
tive requirements of NEPA, the court stated:
[W]e believe that courts have an obligation to review sub-
stantive agency decisions on the merits. Whether we look
to common law or the Administrative Procedure Act, absent
"legislative guidance as to reviewability, an administrative
determination affecting legal rights is reviewable unless some,
special reason appears for not reviewing."
4
4
The court noted that important legal rights had been affected,
and that no special reasons had been asserted for not reviewing
the decision of the agency.45 Furthermore, substantive judicial re-
38. Id. at 757-758. The court listed ten reasons for the insufficiency of the impact state-
ment. Among the most significant in terms of demonstrating the thoroughness of the
court's demands were the following:
(3) The statements did not set forth all of the environmental impacts (which
would result from the construction of the embankment), which are known
to the defendants by their own investigations or which have been broughtj to
their attention by others.
(4) The statements do not adequately set forth the adverse environmental: effects
which can not [sic] be avoided should the dam be built as planned.
(5) The statements do not adequately explore the alternatives to the proposed
action.
(6) The statements do not adequately bring to the reader's attention all "ii-
reversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented."
Id. at 758.
39. Id. at 759.
40. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs. of United States Army, 842
F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972) afi'd on other grounds,, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
41. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
42. Id. at 297.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 298.
45. Id. at 298-99.
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view, the court felt, would implement NEPA's purposes."
In establishing a standard of review, the court adopted the
test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.47 Although Overton Park dealt
specifically with provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 5 and
the Department of Transportation Act,' 4 the Court formulated gen-
eral guidelines that could be used in measuring agency compliance
with any Congressional enactment.50 First, the court must ascertain
whether the agency exceeded its scope of authority. 1 Next, it
must determine whether the final decision was an abuse of dis-
cretion. 52 Where NEPA is applicable, the court must first decide
whether the agency's decision resulted from a good faith considera-
tion of environmental factors. 3 Taking into account NEPA's policy
considerations, the court must then determine whether "the actual
balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or
clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. ' 54 By
using this test, the court in Environmental Defense Fund seemed
to indicate that the agencies cannot meet NEPA's requirements
by merely disclosing the likely harm; they must also make a
substantial effort to minimize the damage to the environment.
55
Despite NEPA's silence as to judicial review, some courts have
not been reluctant to oversee agency decisions which are subject
to its guidelines. Though the caveat is almost always offered that
"[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency," 56 there is a distinct trend among the circuits
to encroach as much as possible on the agency's decisionmaking
power.57 Indeed, these cases seem to indicate that in certain cir-
cumstances the court can become, in effect, the final decisionmaker.
In those instances where the agency has clearly abused its dis-
cretion, it appears that a court may step in to set aside the
decision.58
46. Id. at 298.
47. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For a discussion of
this case see text accompanying notes 78-98 infra.
48. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
49. 49 U.S.C. 1 1659(f) (1970).
50. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971).
51. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
55. This interpretation of NEPA was subsequently asserted in clear and unequivocal
language in Sierra Club v. Froehlke 5 ERC 1033, 1065-66 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
56. See e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army,
470 F.2d 289, 800 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972) quoting Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
57. See note 80 supra.
58. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army,
470 F.2d 289, 801 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). Clearly, thee courts do
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At first glance, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
seems to have demonstrated a pronounced judicial activism in
subjecting agency decisions that fall within NEPA's coverage to
substantive judicial review. However, a comparison with the tra-
ditional test used by courts concerning the necessity of the legis-
lative exercise of eminent domain power reveals that the Eighth
Circuit position is well-founded.
Courts have always been able to determine whether a necessity
exists at all for the eminent domain action, but have not been
able to judge the wisdom of such an action. The standard used
is whether the legislature's exercise is arbitrary and capricious,
or made in bad faith.59 The Eighth Circuit employed that precise
test in its review of agency action. 60 The only palpable difference
is that in making its determination as to whether the agency's
action was arbitrary and capricious, the court examined the agency's
compliance with NEPA. To adequately test whether the agency's
behavior was capricious, the court could not be satisfied with mere
procedural obedience, no matter how detailed. Rather, it had to
inquire into whether the agency had made a legitimate attempt
"to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man. . . ."61 Thus, the standard for review of the necessity
of the legislature's exercise of eminent domain remains the same;
the scope of review, however, has been broadened by NEPA's
requirement that environmental effects be taken into account in
agency decisionmaking.
There may, however, be a significant difference in the plain-
tiff's burden of proof where compliance with NEPA is in issue.
Traditionally, the plaintiff had a heavy burden to show arbitrariness
on the part of the legislature.6 2 In reference to NEPA, however,
the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of noncompli-
ance with NEPA03 The burden is then shifted to the agency which
has the expertise, the time, and the resources to undertake a
careful environmental assessment of its action.64
not have the power to make a final decision. However, through use of their veto power they
can have a profound influence on that decision.
59. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
60. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 470
F .2d 289, 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). This test Is also prescribed
in § 706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). The point here,
however, Is that the court is essentially litigating the issue of whether a necessity for the con-
demnation exists at all. To condemn the vast amount of land necessary for these projects, the
federal agency must, pursuant to NEPA, determine that the need for the project outweighs
the environmental cost. The test which the courts apply to examine the agency decision Is
whether the decision is an arbitrary and capricious one-the precise standard used in the
common law necessity test.
61. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
62. 1 NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11[2] at 4-165 (3rd ed. 1973).
63. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 ERC 1033, 1062 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
64. Id.
NOTES
B. FEDERAL HIGHWAY LEGISLATION
Federal aid for highway construction was initially designed to
encourage states to build their own highways,6 5 and to create
a national system of highways.6 6 As the federal share of the costs
of highway construction has increased over the years, so has the
degree of federal control over particular projects."7 This is espe-
cially true with regard to route selection.6 8 The state highway
departments select the routes initially; public hearings are held
on each highway project, and then the architectural plans as well
as the transcripts of the public hearing are submitted to the Secre-
tary of Transportation for his approval. 6 Before 1966, the Secretary
was not required to take environmental factors into account in
making his decision. 70 However, in 1966 Congress enacted section
15 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act (FAHA) which was designed
to protect "Federal, State, and local government parklands and
historic sites. ' ' 71 This section required that the Secretary of Trans-
portation not approve programs using such lands for highway proj-
ects "unless such program includes all possible planning, including
consideration of alternatives to the use of such land, to minimize
any harm to such park or site resulting from such use.
' ' 72
Shortly after the enactment of Section 15, Congress passed the
Department of Transportation Act 73 (DOT), which included a pro-
vision to further restrict the Secretary of Transportation's discre-
tion in locating a highway through a park. Section 4(f) of DOT
provides that to approve locating a highway through a park, the
Secretary must find that no "feasible and prudent" alternative
routes exist. 4 Furthermore, once he makes this finding, the Secre-
tary can only go forward with the project if the plans include
all possible methods to minimize harm to the park.75 In a 1968
amendment to the FAHA, Congress adopted the wording of 4(f)
and eliminated the nebulous language of Section 15.76 By this
amendment, Congress emphasized the necessity of considering alter-
nate routes.7
65. Act of July 11, 1916, ch. 241, § 6, 39 Stat. 357-58.
66. Act of Nov. 9, 1921, ch. 119, § 6, 42 Stat. 212, 213.
67. Note, Favoring Parks Over Highways-A First Step Toward Resolving the Conflict
Between Preservation of Environmental Amenities and Expansion of the Highway System,




71. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-575 § 15, 80 Stat. 771.
72. Id.
73. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931-50 (1966).
74. Id. § 4(f). (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970)).
75. Id.
76. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 15, 82 Stat. 823-24. (codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970)).
77. Note, Favoring Parks Over Highways--A First Step Toward Resolving the Conflict
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In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe '7 8 the
United States Supreme Court held that the final route approval
decision by the Secretary of Transportation to authorize a six lane
highway through a public park in Memphis, Tennessee, was subject
to judicial review79 pursuant to section 701 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 0 Section 701 precludes judicial review only where
review is prohibited by statute, or where "agency action is commit-
ted to agency discretion by law."81 The Court ruled that neither
restriction was applicable to the case at bar. 2 The Court found
no legislative intent to limit access to the courts.8 Furthermore,
the Court indicated that the final decision could not be left to
the unfettered discretion of the agency, since statutory requirements
were applicable.8 4 In this case, these requirements were sections
4(f) of DOT and 138 of FAHA.15 For an agency decision to meet
the requirement of being "feasible," the Court ruled that the Secre-
tary must demonstrate that sound engineering precludes the con-
struction of the highway along another route.8 For the decision
to be "prudent," the Secretary must comply with the Congressional
intent to place paramount importance on the preservation of park-
lands. 7 This means that parks cannot be sacrificed unless "truly
unusual factors" are present, "or the cost of community disruption
resulting from alternative routes" is extraordinary.8
The Court next elucidated the standard for review. First, the
reviewing court must determine whether the Secretary exceeded
his statutory authority.8 9 To make this determination, the court
must define that authority; 90 it must then make a finding of
fact that the Secretaray reasonably believed that he has acted within
that authority.9 1 Second, the court must decide whether the Secre-
tary's final decision was arbitrary or capricious.9 2 This calls for
a decision as to whether all relevant factors have been considered
and whether the Secretary has made a "clear error of judgment."93
Between Preservation of Environmental Amenities and Expansion of the Highway System,
57 IOWA L. RPv. 834, 839 (1972).
78. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
79. Id. at 410.
80. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
81. Id.
82. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1972).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 410. "Plainly, there is 'law to apply' and thus the exemption for action 'com-
mitted to agency discretion' is inapplicable." Id.
85. Id. at 411. The Court makes reference to § 4(f) of DOT and § 138 of FARA. As has
been pointed out supra note 76, § 15 has been codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
86. Id. at 411.
87. Id. at 411-13.
88. Id. at 413. The Court summed up its position by stating that "[ijf the statutes are
to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction of parkland unless he
finds that alternative routes present unique problems." Id.
89. Id. at 415.
90. Id. at 415-16.




Finally, it must be determined if the Secretary complied with
all the necessary procedural requirements.9 4 The Court noted that
the Secretary need not produce formal findings. 95 However, it did
emphasize that the court must review the Secretary's decision based
on a full and complete administrative record.99
After establishing that the Secretary's decision was subject to
judicial review and presenting the standards for that review, the
Court remanded the case to the district court for a plenary review.
9 7
The full administrative record, the Court noted, had not been pre-
sented, and therefore no decision could be made concerning
the propriety of the Secretary's decision.9 8
On remand, the District Court for the Western District of Ten-
nessee held that the Secretary had not determined that there was
no "feasible and prudent" alternative.9 9 In holding its plenary hear-
ing, the court made every effort to comply with the Supreme
Court's directive that the inquiry be substantial, thorough, probing
and in depth.100 The court not only granted plaintiff's request for
discovery, 011 but also allowed plaintiffs to question directly agency
personnel responsible for the decision. 10 2 The plaintiffs were also
allowed to bring in their own experts to provide the court with
opinions as to the expertise exercised by the Secretary. 10 3 Finally,
the court permitted the plaintiffs to introduce expert testimony
of feasible and prudent alternatives.1 04
Besides finding that the Secretary had not determined that
there was no feasible and prudent alternative, the court ruled
that the Secretary did not apply the correct legal standard in
reaching his decision. 10 5 His interpretation of the words, "feasible
and prudent," differed from the Supreme Court's construction in
a number of ways. First, the court noted that the Secretary, in
making his determination as to whether the alternative route was
93. Id. The Court warned, however, that this standard is a narrow one, and that a court
must not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Id.
94. Id. at 417.
95. Id. at 417-419.
96. Id. at 420. The Court authorized the District Court to use various methods to supple-
ment the administrative record if it were not sufficient to determine whether the Secretary
acted within the scope of his authority and if his actions comported with the applicable
standard. The district court could either question the administrative officials who made
the decision, or allow the Secretary to present formal findings of fact. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 878-879 (W.D.
Tenn. 1972). The press release which Secretary Volpe used to make his announcement con-
cerning his decision indicated that "[tihe options of this Administration were few, mainly
because the route of the highway had previously been determined." Id.
100. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1970).
101. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 877 (W.D. Tenn.
1972).
102. Id. This is not allowed as a matter of course.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 879.
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a "prudent" one, had merely balanced the detriment to the park
against the cost of avoiding the park.106 This was clearly prohibited
by the Supreme Court's ruling in Overton that the Secretary shall
give paramount weight to the policy of park preservation. 10 7 Second,
the court said that the Secretary had implied in an affidavit that
he had not used the correct standard. 08 Finally, nothing in the
administrative record indicated that anyone at the Department of
Transportation in 1969 had construed the 4(f) standard to be so
narrow. 09 After identifying these deficiencies, the court remanded
the action to the Secretary of Transportation with orders that he
comply with the applicable law." 0
Subsequently, the Secretary issued a decision stating that "I
cannot find . . .that there are no prudent and feasible alternatives
to the use of the parkland. . . .""I In response to that determination,
the defendant petitioned, the district court to remand the action
once again to the Secretary contending that the Secretary had
failed to comply with the statutes." 2 The district court ruled that
the Secretary's decision was insufficient and ordered another re-
mand."3S
The court first stated that Section 4(f) requires the Secretary
to find that there are "no feasible and prudent alternatives" to
locating a highway through parkland. 114 The court then reasoned
that if he does not approve the route through the parkland, he
must find that there was a feasible and prudent alternative. 115 In
a careful reading of the Secretary's statement, the court concluded
that the Secretary's double negative - that he could not find that
there was no feasible alternative - was not synonomous with saying
that there was, in fact, a feasible and prudent alternative.16 Fur-
thermore, the court asserted that the Secretary must designate
the alternative '7 to insure that the State defendant received mean-
ingful judicial review. 118
106. Id.
107. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1972).
108. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 879 (W.D. Tenn.
1972). "In his affidavit, the Secretary does say that, applying the correct standard as laid
down in the Supreme Court's decision, he would have concluded that there was no feasible
and prudent alternative to the park route, but he does not say that he applied such a
standard when he made the decision." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 885.
111. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 5 ERC 1241, 1242 (W.D. Tenn.
1979).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1244.
114. Id. at 1243. The Court also noted that 4(f) requires that the proposal to place a
highway through a park must Include "all possible planning to minimize harm to such
park." Id.
115. Id. at 1244.
116. Id. at 1243-44.




NEPA, FAHA, and DOT have been construed by the courts
as requiring the administrative agencies to engage in a thorough
and exacting review of their decisions in order to put into effect
the Congressional policy of environmental preservation. This com-
bination of legislative and judicial action has clearly broadened
the scope of review with regard to the necessity of a "taking."
Though the ultimate standard of capriciousness is essentially the
same as at common law, courts may now assess administrative
decisions to ensure that environmental consequences have been
taken into account.
For courts to engage in effective judicial review of these de-
cisions, however, they must have a reasonably concrete rule with
which to work. Legislative cliches that call for "environmental
preservation" will not suffice because it is nearly impossible to
apply this generic term to mountains of technical data.
Unlike NEPA's vague standards, sections 4(f) of DOT and 138
of FAHA seem to give the courts a more tangible means of meas-
urement. By engaging in a thorough and exacting review of the
type sanctioned in Overton, courts can reasonably assure them-
selves that when the Secretary plans to locate a highway through
a park, he has, in fact, no feasible and prudent alternative and
has taken the necessary steps to minimize the damage to the
park. Furthermore, giving the defendant the burden of justifyfing
his harmful activity is consistent with the legislative policy of
environmental protection.
The district court, on remand from the Supreme Court in
Overton, demonstrated that by strictly applying the feasible and
prudent alternative test, agency decisions can be made more re-
sponsive to the legislative mandate. 119 Although the Overton ruling
is limited to cases where agencies plan to use parkland for highway
construction, it may serve as a guide for subsequent legislative
enactments designed to preserve environmental amenities.1
20
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE STATE EXERCISE OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN POWER-MINNESOTA
Highways which are part of the interstate system receive sub-
119. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 5 ERC 1241 (W.D. Tenn. 1973),
enforcing 335 F. Supp. 873 (1972), enforcing 401 U.S. 402 (1972).
120. The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act provides that:
A "defendant may . . . show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is
no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is consistent with
and reasonably required for promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare
in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air, water,
land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction."
MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971) (emphasis added).
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stantial federal money and are therefore subject to the federal
environmental statutes discussed above. State highways and roads
constructed with only state monies are not subject to such legis-
lation. Until recently, state courts had few rules with which to
examine the state's exercise of eminent domain power. 121 Now,
however, some state courts are applying newly enacted state en-
vironmental statutes to control the state's exercise of eminent do-
main power.
12
This section will discuss important aspects of the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act,1 2 3 one of the most progressive state
statutes of its kind. The discussion will also include comments
on a recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision 24 which used that
Act to restrict the state's exercise of eminent domain power to
build a highway through a marshland.
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act was enacted to pro-
vide the courts with greater power to protect the environment.1
25
The Act permits any private individual or group residing within
the state to seek "an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water,
land and other natural resources located within the state from
pollution, impairment or destruction.' 126 Although the act provides
for four separate actions,'1 27 this discussion will focus only on that
action most likely to be used to curtail the exercise of eminent
domain power: a civil action against "any person for the protec-
tion of the air, water, land, or other natural resources located
121. See e.g., Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power and Light Co., 245 So.2d 209 (Fla.
1971) ; Ragland v. State Dep't. of Transp., 242 So.2d 475 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Texas
Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).
For a discussion of these cases see Annot. 47 A.L.R.3d 1267 (1973).
122. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (1979); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201
et seq. (1973-74); N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CoNsEavATIoN LAW §§ 1-0101 et seq. (McKinney
1973).
123. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.14 (1971).
124. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
125. Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575, 604 (1972).
The statute also provides for cooperation between the courts and agencies. Id. at 604-05.
126. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01. This section also sets out Minnesota's policy concerning en-
vironmental protection:
The legislature finds and declares that each person Is entitled by right to the
protection, preservation and enhancement of air, water, land and other natural
resources located within the state and that each person has the responsibility
to contribute to the protection, preservation, and enhancement thereof. The legis-
lature further declares its policy to create and maintain within the state condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony in order
that present and future generations may enjoy clean air and water, productive
land, and other natural resources with which this state has been endowed.
Id.
127. The authorized actions are the following:
(1) an action to enforce existing environmental quality standards. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 116B.03(1), (5) (1971).
(2) an action to enjoin conduct which materially adversely affects the environment.
Id.
(3) an action involving Intervention Into administrative proceedings or judicial review
thereof where the conduct at issue is alleged to have caused pollution. Id. § 116B.09 (1).
(4) an action challenging the adequacy of state environmental quality standards or
regulations. Id. § 116B.10(l).
within the state whether publicly or privately owned, from pollution,
impairment or destruction .... ,,128
To maintain an action under the Minnesota Act, the plaintiff
must present a prima facie case that defendant's conduct has
caused or is likely to cause environmental degradation as defined
by the Act. 12 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case, the defendant may introduce evidence rebutting plaintiff's
claims.180 This provision places the overall burden of persuasion
on the plaintiff.' 13 Furthermore, once the plaintiff has met his burden
or production, the issue goes to the jury. 1" 2 The plaintiff is not
granted a directed verdict if the defendant fails to answer.3 8
In addition to submitting rebuttal evidence, the defendant may
claim that no "feasible and prudent" alternative exists for the
conduct at issue, and that the conduct reasonably comports with
and promotes "the public health, safety, and welfare in light of
the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air, water,
land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or
destruction."13 4 To satisfy the "no feasible and prudent alternative"
part of the test, the defendant must show that no technological
alternative exists, or, if one does exist, it is simply too costly
in light of the benefits expected from the project. 8 5 Once this
test has been met, the defendant must show that the conduct
in question will so enhance the public health, safety, and welfare
that the destruction of natural resources in order to continue the
activity is justified. Economic considerations, however, cannot be
the sole justification for the activity. 136 To determine whether the
defendant has met his burden, the factfinder must carefully balance
the conflicting factors involved. In the case of a highway, the
factfinder must weigh the public's interest in convenient transpor-
tation against the interest in protecting the public from the pollu-
tion and environmental deterioration that such a project would
cause.
If the plaintiff receives a favorable verdict, the court must
determine the relief to be granted. The Act gives the court a
considerable range of choices:
128. Id. § 116B.03(1). § 116B.02(2)' (1971) provides that the term, "person",
means any natural person, any state, municipality or other governmental Or
political subdivision or other public agency or instrumentality, ony public or
private corporation, any partnership, firm, association, or other organization,
any receiver, trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal representative of any of the
foregoing, and any other entity....
129. Id. § 116B.04.
130. Id.
131. Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MiNN. L. REv. 575, 598 (1972).
132. Id. at 598-599.
193. Id.
134. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971).
135. Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MNN. L. R1v. 575, 599-600 (1972).
136. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971).
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The court may grant declaratory relief, temporary and per-
manent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions upon
a party as are necessary or appropriate to protect the air,
water, land or other natural resources located within the
state from pollution, impairment, or destruction. 137
In County of Freeborn v. Bryson,138 the petitioners brought
an action under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act alleging
that the act prohibited the county from condemning part of a
natural wildlife marsh for highway use. 3 9 Petitioners argued that
the proposed condemnation would materially and adversely affect
portions of the marsh. The Minnesota Supreme Court observed
that the appeal raised three issues of first impression with regard
to the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act. They were: (1) whether
the parties had standing to bring the action; (2) whether the coun-
try's power of eminent domain was circumscribed by the act; and
(3) whether the petitioner had established a prima -facie case.
1 40
The court easily resolved the issue of standing by noting that
the petitioner was clearly a "natural person" under section
1 16B.02 (2) of the Act.1 4 1
In holding that the statute limited the county's exercise of
eminent domain power, 42 the court interpreted the Act broadly,
but not unreasonably. The court first established that the legislature
could modify or withdraw a delegation of the eminent domain
power.'4 3 The court then noted that the Act's sweeping proscription
of "any conduct" that may do substantial harm to the environment
should not be limited by judicial fiat. 4 4 Furthermore, the broad
policy statement in Section 116B.01 of the Act persuaded the court
that the legislature had intended to limit the power of eminent
domain, including delegations of that power to a county to condemn
land for a public highway. 1 45
Before proceeding to the final issue, the court commented brief-
ly concerning the Act's effect on the traditional necessity rule.
According to the court, the Act modified the notion that the ques-
tion of necessity was almost exclusively left to the judgment of
the condemnor.146 Particular exercises of eminent domain power
could now be judicially limited to the extent that they did not
comport with the Act.
1 4 7
137. Id. § 116B.07.
198. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
139. Id. at 292.
140. Id. at 294.
141. Id. at 294-95. See note 125 supra, __
142. Id. at 295.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 296.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 1N. M 296-297.
NOTES
Finally, the court noted that the petitioner must prove two
elements to establish a prima facie case. First, the petitioner must
show: "(1) [a] protectable natural resource, and (2) pollution,
impairment or destruction of that resource."'1 8 From the evidence
presented, the court ruled that petitioner had proved both elements
and therefore had established a prima facie case. 49
In reversing the trial court's ruling that petitioner had failed
to establish a prima facie case, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the trial court to allow the defendants to present any
affirmative defenses that they might have under the Act. 50
In ruling that the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act per-
mitted judicial review of the environmental necessity of an exercise
of eminent domain power, the Minnesota Supreme Court has set
a significant precedent. Though other courts have implied that
environmental statutes affect the scope of judicial review of the
legislature's assessment of the necessity of a taking,8 1 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court was the first to clearly broach the issue.
Bryson is also important because the court clarified the mean-
ing of a prima facie showing of non-compliance with the Act.
The plaintiff need only show that the defendant's action will pollute,
impair, or destroy a protectable natural resource within the state.'
5 2
By noting that the legislature "[o]bviously . . . intended that
there should be a balancing of ecological against technological con-
siderations through the Environmental Rights Act,"'' 13 the court
seemed to indicate that a prima facie showing would only be
enough to get the question to the jury. According to the statute,
the defendant "may" present either evidence to the contrary, or
an affirmative defense to rebut the prima facie showing.
154
Unfortunately, it may be possible for the defendant to benefit
from this provision in a way not intended by the legislature. If
the defendant decides to introduce contrary evidence, or establish
an affirmative defense, the jury has a somewhat easier task than
148. Id. at 297.
149. Id. The court noted that:
The area contains abundant animal and botanical life along with water, land,
timber, soil, and quietude resources. We similarly conclude that the evidence
shows that the construction of the highway would materially adversely affect
this natural resource. In support of this, we point out the following uncontro-
verted facts: (1) The highway would divide a natural mash; (2) the entire
marsh is an ecological unit; (8) the construction would eliminate some of the
area's natural physical assets; (4) the highway would be a relatively high-
speed, high-volume roadway which would increase animal fatalities; and (5)
the quietness and solitude of the marsh would be disturbed. In addition, there
are the uncontroverted opinions of the expert witnesses that the highway would
have a significant detrimental effect on the marsh.
Id.
150. Id. at 298.
151. See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
152. County of Freeborn v. Bryson. 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (MhintL 1973).
153. Id. at 297.
154. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971).
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if the defendant remains silent. For example, if the defendant
assumes the burden of proving that there is no "feasible and
prudent alternative" to the conduct in question, the jury has a
nearly tangible test with which to work. Furthermore, the burden
is on the defendant to justify his environmentally harmful activity.
This shifting of the burden to the pollutor is in keeping with the
state's policy of environmental preservation. If, on the other hand,
the defendant remains silent, the jury is forced to make a decision
based only on a vague policy statement.155 Notwithstanding the
psychological effect on the jury of the defendant's failure to intro-
duce evidence, a defendant with a weak case may be wise to
say nothing in order to force the jury to fumble about with an
unworkable standard. This untoward result could be eliminated by
an amendment making it clear that a verdict will be directed
for the plaintiff if the defendant does not attempt to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie showing. This would further implement the
state's goal of protection of the ecosystem.
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the environmental statutes considered in this discussion
has affected the scope of judicial review concerning the necessity
of a taking. The National Environmental Policy Act requires that
agencies take into account environmental values in making their
decision. The weight of authority suggests that these agency deci-
sions should be subjected to substantive judicial review.
In assessing the agency's compliance with NEPA, a court can
only set aside a decision if it is arbitrary and capricious, the precise
standard used at common law to ascertain the necessity of a taking.
But to make a decision as to whether the taking is an arbitrary
one, the court must consider the agency's response to environmental
harm. Despite the reduced burden of proof on the plaintiff which
some courts have alluded to,156 this approach to the problem of
curbing environmental harm caused by eminent domain power does
not appear to be a substantially effective one. The statutory pre-
scriptions which agencies are supposed to follow are vague and
obscure. Notwithstanding the encouraging policy statement,'157 the
Act lacks a clear standard which courts can use to measure agency
compliance. Perhaps NEPA's greatest value has been that it has
placed an overwhelming burden of paperwork on the shoulders of
federal agencies and thereby has discouraged a few of the more
ill-conceived agency projects.
58
155. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 see note 121 supra.
156. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 ERC 1033, 1061-62 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
157. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
158. The wealth and complexity of the information necessary to make an intelligent de-
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NOTES
As construed by the Supreme Court in Overton Park, sections
4(f) of DOT and 138 of FAHA provide a more palpable alternative
to plaintiffs seeking to prevent the environmental deterioration that
accompanies locating highways through parks. By allowing the courts
to review thoroughly the agency's decision that there is no "feasible
and prudent" alternative to the Secretary's decision to sacrifice
a park for highway purposes, the Supreme Court has given review-
ing courts a means of strictly controlling agency decisions in this
limited area. 159 Although the ultimate standard of review is arbi-
trariness, the courts, through the strict use of the "feasible and
prudent alternative" test, can have a greater impact on agency
decisions than through the use of NEPA.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Bryson held that the Minne-
sota Environmental Rights Act permits courts to consider environ-
mental consequences in state eminent domain actions. Consequently,
the traditional "necessity" rule that courts had no review powers
unless the state abused its discretion was limited. This approach
is to be clearly distinguished from the role of the courts with regard
to the NEPA, DOT and FAHA. Under these acts, courts can, in
effect, only determine whether a necessity exists at all. Under the
Minnesota Act, however, the court may review the environmental
aspects of the case, balance the factors involved, and make the
final decision. Furthermore, Bryson made it clear that the plaintiff's
burden of proof was to be a minimal one. Though not without
defect, 16° this Minnesota formula provides an effective method which
environmentalists may use to protect precious natural resources
by showing a lack of necessity for the taking.
THOMAS L. HAMLIN
cision are so great that it is only fair to place the burden of proof on an agency which
has access to the needed resources. One court has stated that:
[T]he very nature of the problem in this legal area is so extensive that if the
burden were placed wholly upon citizen plaintiffs, the full disclosure require-
ments of NEPA would never be implemented satisfactorily and environmental
protection as contemplated by Congress would be little more than a fiction.
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 ERC 1033, 1062 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
159. As has been pointed out, initial Indications are that lower courts have eagerly taken
up the Supreme Court mandate. See text accompanying notes 99-118 supra.
160. A slight change in the statute should be made to ensure that the factfinder is pre-
sented with a concrete standard and to protect against abuse. See text accompanying
notes 154-55 supra.
For a discussion of the reasons for increasing the role of the courts in the area of
environmental disputes see J. SAX, DErENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, 108-24 (1970).

